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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Watson Coniconde appeals from his judgment of conviction, as amended by the
district court's order amending judgment, arguing the district court erred in ordering his driver's
license suspension commence upon his release from incarceration rather than upon his
conviction because, pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-1404(3 ), a license suspension for felony
eluding must commence upon conviction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Coniconde pled guilty to felony eluding and placing an obstruction on a railroad
track. (8/17/18 Tr., p.25, Ls.8-14; R., pp.97, 101-02.) At the change of plea hearing,
Mr. Coniconde told the district court he was driving a 1998 Jeep Cherokee over 30 miles per
hour over the posted speed limit, and willfully fled and attempted to elude a police vehicle that
was giving him a visual signal to stop. (7/19/18 Tr., p.17, L.17 - p.18, L.23.) He placed the
vehicle in the path of an oncoming train, apparently by pushing it over the edge of a steep hill.
(7/19/18 Tr., p.18, L.24-p.19, L.7, 8/17/18 Tr., p.32, Ls.18-24.)
Before accepting Mr. Coniconde' s guilty plea, the district court described the penalty for
felony eluding as follows: "The maximum penalty for that offense is five years of incarceration
and/or $50.000." (7/19/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-6.) The district court continued:

"There's also a

mandatory driver's license suspension. It's an absolute suspension without any restricted
privileges for one year. I have to suspend your license for one year if you plead guilty to this. I
can extend that driver's license suspension up to a maximum of five years." 1 (7/19/18 Tr., p.7,

1

The district court was mistaken. The district court only had discretion to suspend
Mr. Coniconde's license for up to three years under Idaho Code§ 49-1404(3).
1

Ls.9-14.) The district court did not explain to Mr. Coniconde the start date for the license
suspension.
The district court sentenced Mr. Coniconde for each felony to a unified term of five
years, with two years fixed, to be served concurrently. (R., p.99; 8/17/18 Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27,
L.13, p.36, L.24 - p.37, L.5.) At sentencing, the district court said it was suspending
Mr. Coniconde's driver's license for a three-year period that "begins from the time that you're
released on parole or when you're out of the prison." (8/17/18 Tr., p.37, Ls.6-11.) The judgment
reflects that Mr. Coniconde's driving privileges "shall be absolutely suspended for a period of
three (3) years commencing upon [his] release from incarceration . . . ." (R., p.99.)
Mr. Coniconde filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.98-100, 103-05.)
Mr. Coniconde next filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 for
reconsideration of sentence. (R., pp.111-13.) He argued the district court erred in ordering his
license suspension commence upon his release from incarceration rather than upon his
conviction based on the language of section 49-1404(3). (R., p.112.) At the Rule 35 hearing,
Mr. Coniconde testified regarding the opportunities and programming available to him within the
Idaho Department of Correction. (1/25/19 Tr., p.6, L.14 - p.7, L.12.) He also testified he
intended to return to his union road construction job upon his release, and would need to operate
a vehicle as part of his work. (1/25/19 Tr., p.8, L.18 - p.9, L.16.) He asked the district court to
reduce his license suspension from three years to one year, commencing upon the date of his
conviction rather than the date of his release from incarceration. (1/25/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-19.)
The district court reduced Mr. Coniconde's license suspension from 36 months to 18
months, but the district court did not change the start date for the suspension. ( 1/25/19 Tr., p.16,
Ls.1-12.) The district court explained:

2

The Court, although it has some discretion here, does not fmd it to be really - to
make sense to allow someone to serve a driver's license suspension while they're
in an institution where they cannot, in fact, drive anyway. There's no deterrence
there to suspend a license in a time when you can't drive. There's no punishment.
There's no deterrence. There's no rational relationship between that suspension
and the goals of sentencing.
So this Court believes it needs to start, to make any sense at all, from the time
when that person has the ability to get licensed again.
(1/25/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.13-24.) The district court entered an order amending judgment on
January 28, 2019, 2 which states Mr. Coniconde's driving privileges "shall be absolutely
suspended for a period of one ( 1) year and six (6) months commencing upon release from
incarceration and/or imprisonment imposed pursuant to the [Judgment] dated August 20, 2018." 3
(Motion to Augment, Ex. A.)

2

The Order Amending Judgment, dated January 28, 2019, is not included in the Clerks' Record.
Simultaneously with the filing of this brief, Mr. Coniconde is filing a Motion to Augment to
include a copy of this Order in the Record.
3
The Judgment of Conviction is dated August 20, 2018, but was not filed until August 21, 2018.
(Motion to Augment, Ex. A.)
3

ISSUE
Did the district court err in ordering Mr. Coniconde's driver's license suspension commence
upon his release from incarceration rather than upon his conviction?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Ordering Mr. Coniconde's Driver's License Suspension Commence
Upon His Release From Incarceration Rather Than Upon His Conviction

A.

Introduction
The district court erred in ordering Mr. Coniconde 's driver's license suspension

commence upon his release from incarceration rather than upon his conviction because, pursuant
to Idaho Code § 49-1404(3), a license suspension for felony eluding commences upon a finding
of guilt as reflected in a judgment of conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation of a statute presents a legal question over which this Court exercises

free review. State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 106 (2015).

C.

Idaho Code § 49-1404(3) Unambiguously Provides That A License Suspension For
Felony Eluding Commences Upon A Finding Of Guilt As Reflected In A Judgment Of
Conviction
Statutory construction "must begin with the literal words of the statute" and "those words

must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning" and "the statute must be construed is a
whole." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003) (citations
omitted). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the
law as written." Id. (citation omitted).
Idaho Code§ 49-1404(3) is not ambiguous. The literal words of the statute provide that a
license suspension for felony eluding commences upon a finding of guilt as reflected in a
judgment of conviction. The statute states:
The department shall suspend the driver's license or privileges of a person who
has pled guilty or is found guilty of a misdemeanor violation of this section,

5

notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment, as provided in
section 49-326, Idaho Code. 4 Any person who has pled guilty or is found guilty of
a felony violation of the provisions of this section, notwithstanding the form of
the judgment or withheld judgment, shall have his driving privileges suspended
by the court for a minimum of one (1) year, which may extend to three (3) years,
at the discretion of the court, during which time he shall have absolutely no
driving privileges of any kind.
Under the plain language of this statute, the district court must revoke the driving privileges of
any person who has pled guilty or is found guilty of felony eluding for a minimum of one year,
and a maximum of three years. The start date for the license suspension must be the entry of the
judgment of conviction (regardless of the form of the judgment), as there is no other date
referenced in the statute.
Here, the district court found Mr. Coniconde guilty of felony eluding in the judgment of
conviction, which was filed on August 21, 2018. The judgment states:
Count I- Idaho Code 49-1404(2), Eluding, a Felony.
Count II - Idaho Code 18-6009, Placing an Obstruction on a Railroad Track, a
Felony.
THAT YOU ARE GUILTY OF THE CRIME(S) SO CHARGED ....
(R., p.99.) The district court did not have discretion to order Mr. Coniconde's license suspension
commence upon his release from incarceration under the plain language of section 49-1404(3).

4

Idaho Code § 49-326 states, in pertinent part, "If the court has not ordered the suspension of a
license or privileges, the department is authorized to suspend, disqualify or revoke the license or
privileges of a driver ... upon a showing by its records ... that the driver ... [h]as been
convicted of the offense of reckless driving, or fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, and
providing that the operating privilege shall be suspended for a period of thirty (30) days upon
conviction .... " I.C. § 49-326(1 )(f) (emphasis added).
6

D.

Alternatively, If This Court Concludes Idaho Code§ 49-1404(3) Is Ambiguous, It Should
Interpret The Statute To Mean That A License Suspension For Felony Eluding
Commences Upon A Finding Of Guilt As Reflected In A Judgment Of Conviction
If this Court concludes section 49-1404(3) is capable of more than one reasonable

interpretation with respect to the start date for the running of the license suspension, then this
Court must construe the statute "to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean." City of
Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69 (citation omitted). In determining legislative intent, this Court
"examine[ s] not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." Id. (citations
omitted). The legislature intended that the license suspension for felony eluding run from the
entry of the judgment of conviction.
The most compelling evidence of legislative intent in this case stems from the rule of in
pari materia, which is "a canon of construction used to effectuate legislative intent" when a
statute is ambiguous. In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 345, 350 (2014) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Under the rule of in pari materia, "[w]here a statute with respect to one
subject contains a certain provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute
concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed." City of
Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69 (citation omitted).
The Legislature imposed a mandatory driver's license suspension in the statutes imposing
penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), just as it did in section 48-1404(3).
However, in the DUI statutes, the Legislature made clear that the license suspensions commence
"after release from confinement" or "after release from imprisonment."
Idaho Code § 18-8005 sets forth the penalties for DUI. The statute states, in pertinent
part, that any person who pleads guilty or is found guilty of violating§ 18-8004(1)(a), (b), or (c),
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and who has one prior similar conviction within ten years, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
among other things, "[ s]hall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court" and "[ s]hall
have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an additional mandatory minimum period
of one (1) year after release from confinement .... " I.C. § 18-8005(4)( d), (e) (emphasis added).
Any person who pleads guilty or is found guilty of violating§ 18-8004(l)(a), (b), or (c), and who
has two or more prior similar convictions within ten years, is guilty of a felony and, among other
things, "[ s]hall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court" and "[ s]hall have his driving
privileges suspended by the court for a mandatory minimum period of one ( 1) year after release
from imprisonment . . . and may have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an

additional period not to exceed four (4) years .... " LC. § 18-8005(6)(c), (d) (emphasis added).
Idaho Code § 18-8004C sets forth the penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol
with an excessive alcohol concentration. The statute states, in pertinent part, that any person who
pleads guilty or is found guilty of violating § 18-8004(1 )( a) for the first time, but who has an
alcohol concentration of 0.20 or above, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, among other
things, "[s]hall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court," and "[s]hall have his driving
privileges suspended by the court for an additional mandatory minimum period of one ( 1) year
after release from confinement .. .. " I.C. § 18-8004C(l)(d), (e) (emphasis added). Any person

who pleads guilty or is found guilty of violating § 18-8004 for a second or subsequent offense
shall be guilty of a felony and, among other things, "[s]hall surrender his driver's license or
permit to the court," and "[s]hall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for a
mandatory minimum period of one (1) year after release from imprisonment, and may have his
driving privileges suspended by the court for a period not to exceed five (5) years after release
from imprisonment .... " I.C. § 18-8004C(2)(c), (d) (emphasis added).

8

The DUI statutes discussed above make clear that the Legislature knows what language
to use to start a license suspension at the time a defendant is released from incarceration. The
Legislature did not use the qualifiers "after release from confinement" or "after release from
imprisonment" in section 49-1404(3). That is because the Legislature intended that a license
suspension for felony eluding commence upon the entry of the judgment of conviction.
The district court believed it "does not . . . make sense to allow someone to serve a
driver's license suspension while they're in an institution where they cannot, in fact, drive
anyway." (1/25/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.13-17.) The district court was wrong as a matter of fact and law.
As a matter of fact, the opportunities available to Mr. Coniconde are limited by his lack of a
driver's license even while he is incarcerated. He explained to the district court at the Rule 35
hearing that "there are multiple driving jobs available for inmates providing they have valid
licenses such as plow driving and driving other inmates to and from work details .... " (1/25/19
Tr., p.18, Ls.7-12.) As a matter of law, the district court wrongly interpreted the statute to
provide it with discretion to determine the start date for Mr. Coniconde's license suspension. The
statute provides the district court with discretion to determine the length of a license suspension
(from one to three years), but not with discretion to determine the start date for that suspension.
If this Court believes, "after examining the text, context, history, and policy of the

statute," that there is still an "interpretive tie" regarding the start date for the running of a license
suspension under section 49-1404(3), the tie must be resolved in favor of the defendant under the
rule oflenity. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2014); see also State v. Anderson,
145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008) ("The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly
construed in favor of defendants.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Brown v. State, 137
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Idaho 529, 536 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating that "to the extent the theft statute is ambiguous, the rule
oflenity compels us to construe it in favor of the accused").

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Coniconde respectfully requests that the Court vacate
his judgment of conviction, as amended by the order amending judgment, and remand this case
to the district court with instructions to amend his judgment of conviction to reflect that his 18month license suspension commenced on the date of his conviction.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2019.

Isl Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of May, 2019, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

Isl Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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